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Introduction
In recent years, corporate tax policy in most industrialized countries has been characterized by a trend towards lower tax rates and broader tax bases. In the literature, this trend has been explained as a reaction of national tax policies to border crossing capital mobility and an increasing importance of multinational …rms. There are several reasons why the existence of multinational …rms is thought to have an impact on national corporate tax systems. 1 Firstly, when making their location decisions for investment projects, these …rms usually consider locations in di¤erent countries. Tax considerations are of course not the only factor determining these location decisions, but they are an important one. From the perspective of national tax policy, this gives rise to competitive pressure as countries try to attract …rms.
Secondly, multinational …rms may shift pro…ts across countries without changing the location of their real investment. This may be done either via transfer price manipulation (Hau ‡er and Schjelderup (2000)) or thin capitalization, where …rms increase the amount of debt …n-ancing in high tax countries in order to bene…t from the deductibility of interest from the corporate tax base (Mintz and Smart (2001) ). It is intuitive that international pro…t shifting also leads to downward pressures on national corporate tax rates.
A third important characteristic of multinational …rms is that the ownership of these …rms usually spreads over many countries. This implies that multinational …rms often operate in countries other than those where their owners reside. Foreign …rm ownership is usually thought to act as a break on the downward pressure on corporate tax rates caused by tax competition (Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) ).
This paper reconsiders the implications of foreign …rm ownership and international pro…t shifting through thin capitalization for corporate tax policy. The analysis leads to three main results. Firstly, it turns out that foreign …rm ownership leads to a reduction rather than an increase in corporate tax rates. Secondly, the existence of international pro…t shifting through thin capitalization induces countries to reduce their tax rates and to broaden their tax bases. Thirdly, we show that there is scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination in our model. In the presence of both foreign …rm ownership and income shifting through debt, countries gain from a coordinated increase in corporate tax rates or from a coordinated broadening of the tax base.
How are these …ndings related to the existing literature? The papers most closely related to our analysis are Hau ‡er and Schjelderup (2000), Bond (2000) and Huizinga and Nielsen (1997, 2002) . Hau ‡er and Schjelderup (2000) consider a model where …rms earn supernormal pro…ts and may manipulate transfer prices to shift pro…ts across countries. In the absence of pro…t shifting, countries would levy a cash ‡ow tax which avoids a distortion of marginal investment but taxes pure pro…ts at a con…scatory rate of 100%. However, if …rms may shift income across jurisdictions, they can avoid the con…scatory taxation of pure pro…ts, so that countries are forced to reduce their tax rates. As a result, pure pro…ts are partly untaxed. Given this, it is optimal to tax these pro…ts indirectly by broadening the tax base, even at the cost of distorting domestic investment. Bond (2000) argues that multinational …rms often face a discrete investment choice. For instance, this may be the choice between serving a domestic market either by producing in the country or by locating in another country and serving the domestic market via imports. This implies that the average rather than the marginal tax rate becomes relevant for the location decision. If, in addition, an investment project generates supernormal pro…ts, high statutory rates may deter investment despite generous depreciation allowances. Both papers thus provide an explanation for the observed tax rate cut cum base broadening policies. 2 Our analysis di¤ers from these papers in several respects. Firstly, our model does not rely on the existence of pure pro…ts so that the corporate income tax does not have the function of taxing pure pro…ts. Secondly, we consider income shifting through debt, rather than transfer pricing. Thirdly, the reasons for and the e¤ects of tax rate cut cum base broadening policies are di¤erent in our model. In particular, the broadening of the tax base in Hau ‡er and Schjelderup (2000) deliberately distorts domestic investment, whereas the broadening of the tax base in our model aims at restoring production e¢ciency.
Our result that foreign …rm ownership reduces corporate tax rates is diametrically opposed to the …ndings in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) , who …nd that foreign …rm ownership tends to increase corporate taxes. The reason for this di¤erence in results is that, in our model, the corporate tax has the function of serving as a backstop to personal income taxes while the corporate tax in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) is e¤ectively a tax on economic rents. In their model, these rents partly accrue to foreigners. Therefore host countries have an incentive to raise their corporate tax rates above the level they would choose in the absence of foreign …rm ownership. 3 Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) also …nd that a coordinated reduction of corporate taxes increases welfare in their model whereas our analysis leads to the opposite result. Huizinga and Nielsen (2002) extend the model in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) by considering the case where residence based taxes on portfolio investment cannot be implemented. In this framework, it turns out that the welfare e¤ect of a coordinated reduction of tax rates becomes ambiguous. 4 The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In the next section, we present the model. In section 3, we analyze the optimal tax policy under tax competition, under di¤erent assumptions on foreign …rm ownership and the availability of income shifting opportunities. Section 4 considers the potential for welfare enhancing tax coordination. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Consider a union of n small open economies. Capital is internationally mobile both within the union and between the union and the rest of the world. Each country in the union is the home country of many internationally immobile households and hosts real investment of a large number of multinational …rms. For notational convenience, the number of households per country and the number of multinational …rms are normalized to unity.
Households
Households live for two periods. In the …rst period, they receive an exogenous endowment E and a dividend D 1 5 which may be used for …rst period consumption C 1 or savings S.
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The …rst period budget constraint is
In the second period, the household supplies L units of labour and receives another dividend D 2 . The second period budget constraint is
where C 2 is second period consumption, r is the interest rate in the international capital market, t is the tax rate on savings, w is the wage rate and T is the tax rate on labour income. The household's utility function is given by U (C 1 ; C 2 ; L) and has the usual neoclassical properties. Denote the present value of the dividends accruing to the domestic household by P . Using
and de…ning savings net of dividends received in period 1 as S ¤ = S ¡ D 1 , we can write the budget constraints in (1) and (2) as
and
The household maximizes U (C 1 ; C 2 ; L) subject to (3) and (4). This yields the standard results
where w n = w (1 ¡ T ) and r n = r (1 ¡ t) : (5) and (6) de…ne the (modi…ed) savings function S ¤ = S ¤ (r n ; w n ; P ) and the labour supply function L s = L s (r n ; w n ; P ) : The household's indirect utility function is denoted by V (r n ; w n ; P ) and has the properties V 1 (r n ; w n ; P ) = (S ¤ + P ), V 2 (r n ; w n ; P ) =¸L, V 3 (r n ; w n ; P ) =¸(1 + r (1 ¡ t)), where¸is the marginal utility of second period income.
Firms
We assume that the representative multinational …rm is endowed with retained earnings R and that it operates in each of the n countries in the union. In each country j; j = 1::n, the …rm invests K j in period 1. In period 2, the …rm employs L j units of labour in each country and produces an output
The …rm's investment may be …nanced by retained earnings or debt. New equity as a source of …nance is ruled out. 7 Retained earnings which are not used to …nance investment are distributed to the owners. The …rm's pro…t distribution in period 1 is given by
where ® j is the share of investment in country j …nanced by external debt.
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Next to external debt, the …rm may also use internal debt. The main di¤erence to external debt is that internal debt does not increase dividend distributions. Internal debt is used to avoid corporate taxes. Rather than using equity to …nance investment directly, the …rm may endow a subsidiary in a tax haven country which we assume to be a country outside the union with equity. The subsidiary then borrows its funds back to the parent company. 9 This implies that corporate income takes the form of interest payments, which are deductible from the corporate tax base. To make things simple, we assume that the corporate tax rate in the tax haven country is zero. Moreover, in all countries, foreign pro…ts are assumed to be exempt from domestic corporate tax, so that pro…ts of the subsidiary in the tax haven can be repatriated tax free.
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Under these assumptions, the …rm's reduction in tax costs from replacing one Euro of equity in country j by internal debt is simply equal to the country's corporate tax rate ¿ j . In the following, we denote the share of internal debt in the …rm's investment in country j by ¾ j :
Apart from tax considerations, there are nontax costs and bene…ts associated with the …nancial structure of …rms. We assume that the nontax costs and bene…ts of …nancing in our model can be summarized in a cost function which is given by r
is a function with the following properties:
These assumptions essentially imply that there is a share of external debt ® ¤ which is optimal in the absence of taxes, given ¾: Of course, without taxes, we also have ¾ = 0. If …rms deviate from ® = ® ¤ and ¾ = 0, they face increasing marginal nontax costs of distorting their …nancial structure.
Given that the function ª (®; ¾) is important for the following analysis, it is necessary to justify the assumptions made on ª (®; ¾) , in particular the convexity in ® and ¾. The assumption that ª (®; ¾) is convex in ® follows Mintz and Smart (2002) and may be interpreted as a result of informational asymmetries between outside investors and managers of the …rm. For instance, of there is too little external debt, managers may use the …rm's cash ‡ow to pursue empire building strategies (Hart (1993) ). An increase in external debt reduces the cash ‡ow controlled by managers. But if there is too much debt, the …rm may go bankrupt, which gives rise to bankruptcy costs. Consider next the cost associated with internal debt. In the theoretical literature on the economic role of internal debt, the view is widespread that internal debt is primarily a tax saving instrument (see e.g. Chowdhry and Nanda (1994) and Chowdhry and Coval (1998) ). Recent empirical work by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) con…rms this view but also shows that, despite the tax advantage, the use of internal debt has its limits, i.e. internal debt is usually combined with external debt and equity. One explanation for the fact that multinational …rms cannot use internal debt without limits is that tax authorities are aware of the pro…t shifting opportunities o¤ered by internal debt. Therefore, many governments have introduced anti tax avoidance laws in order to limit pro…t shifting.
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For instance, German corporate tax law includes a rule ( §8a, KStG) whereby interest deductions for internal debt will only be granted if the credit would also have been granted by third parties. Similar rules exist in the UK (see Rowland (1995) ) and in the US (see Levin (1994) ). These rules leave some discretion to tax authorities and courts in dealing with internal debt. It is plausible to assume that the chances of …rms to avoid the application of anti tax avoidance legislation will be better, the smaller the share of internal debt in overall assets. Also, the amount of advice by tax consultants required to achieve a deduction for interest on internal debt is likely to be convex in the level of internal debt. Our model captures this by assuming that ª (®; ¾) is convex in ¾.
The …rm's second period pro…ts are thus given by
where " i is a parameter describing the depreciation allowances of the tax system in country j. True economic depreciation implies " i = 0: Accordingly, " i < 0 implies less than economic depreciation whereas " i > 0 would characterize a tax system with accelerated depreciation. The lowest possible value for " i is " i = ¡1, which would describe the extreme case where investment goods cannot be depreciated for tax purposes at all. The …rst term on the right hand side of (7) represents output minus wage payments minus …nancing costs and the tax free capital repayment K i . The second term is the payment of credit plus interest on external debt. The third term represents the interest deductions on overall debt and the fourth term represents the value of depreciation allowances as far as they deviate from economic depreciation. The …rm maximizes the present value of the dividends paid to the owners. Since there may be owners in di¤erent countries who may face di¤erent capital income tax rates, the question arises how the …rm determines the opportunity cost of investment and, hence, the relevant discount rates. We simply assume that the …rm uses a weighted average of the di¤erent discount rates 12 , so that the objective function of the …rm is
where¯j, j = 1:::n, is the ownership share of the representative household residing in country j . Using (7) into (8) and maximizing (8) over L j and
where
s the cost of capital for investment in country j . Maximization of (8) over ® j and ¾ j yields:
While (9) and (10) are standard marginal productivity conditions, (11) and (12) describe the optimal …nancial structure of the …rm. In the absence of taxes, the …rm minimizes the nontax cost of …nancing by setting ® = ® ¤ and ¾ = 0. If taxes exist but ¿ j = P n i=1¯i t i , the tax system is neutral with respect to the …rm's choice of external debt because the tax advantage of debt caused by the deductibility of interest at the corporate level is neutralized by the taxation of interest income at the personal level. In contrast, if ¿ j < P n i=1¯i t i , the tax system distorts the …nancial structure in favour of equity and vice versa. Of course, as (12) shows, any positive corporate income tax will give rise to income shifting via internal debt (¾ > 0).
Given the assumption that the production function is linear-homogenous in K and L,
. In equilibrium, employment is e¤ectively determined by the labour supply function, i.e. L j = L s j (r n ; w n ; P ): The constant returns to scale assumption implies that there are no (supernormal) pro…ts. Using (9) to (12), it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium,
= R, i.e. the present value of the …rm's stream of dividends is equal to the …rm's endowment with retained earnings.
The government
The government has to …nance a given level of public expenditures (G) using the wage tax, the tax on personal savings and the corporate income tax.
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The government budget constraint is
The …rst and second terms on the right hand side of (13) represent the revenue from the labour and savings income tax. The third term represents revenue from corporate income taxation.
the budget constraint can be written as
3 The optimal tax policy under tax competition
In this section, we derive the optimal tax policy in our model. The government of each country maximizes the utility of the representative citizen and takes the tax policy of all other countries as given. It is convenient to formulate the maximization problem of the government in the following way: max w n j ;t j ;Á j ;¿ j ;" j V (r n ; w n ; P ) s:t:
The formal derivation of the optimal tax policy is given in the appendix. In the text, we only present the results and discuss their economic implications. Our main interest is to analyze the consequences of foreign …rm ownership and income shifting through internal debt for the optimal tax policy of the individual countries. Moreover, we ask whether there is scope for policy coordination among the member states of the union. We therefore proceed in four steps. We start by considering the optimal tax policy of an individual country where the domestic household fully owns the multinational …rm and no internal debt exists. We then consider the case where …rm ownership is symmetric, i.e. the representative household in each country owns a share 1=n in the …rm's equity. The third step is to allow for income shifting. Finally, we will analyze the potential for welfare enhancing policy coordination.
No internal debt, no foreign …rm ownership
This case refers to a situation where the ownership of the multinational …rm is concentrated in one country. We refer to this country as country 1. The possibility of income shifting through debt is ruled out. The optimal tax policy of country 1 may be characterized by the following Proposition 1 If income shifting through internal debt is ruled out (¾ = 0) and if the multinational …rm is fully owned by the domestic household (¯1 = 1), the optimal tax policy in country 1 is given by ¿ 1 = t 1 ; " 1 = 0,°¡°L
Proof: See the appendix.
The interpretation of the results in proposition 1 is as follows. Firstly, the corporate income tax rate is equal to the tax rate on income from personal savings. This re ‡ects that the corporate income tax in our model has the function to prevent that taxpayers avoid the savings tax by deferring the distribution of pro…ts. They can defer pro…t distributions either by increasing the share of equity …nancing or by increasing the level of the …rm's real investment. The optimal tax policy sets ¿ 1 = t 1 in order to avoid distortions of …nancial structure or real investment.
The level of the savings tax and the labour income tax are determined by the usual tradeo¤ between the necessity to raise tax revenue and the distortions of savings and labour supply decisions which characterizes a second best optimal tax system. These considerations are re ‡ected by the …rst two terms on the left hand side of equations (15) and (16). The third term on the left hand side of (16) re ‡ects that part of the household's savings e¤ectively consist of retained earnings which the …rm uses to …nance real investment in other countries. While savings in the form of domestic, equity …nanced real investment are taxed via the corporate income tax, savings in the form of equity …nanced real investment abroad escape domestic taxation. There is nothing the government can do about this in our model. The fourth term on the left hand side of (16) re ‡ects that an increase in the domestic savings tax will induce the multinational …rm to increase the amount of equity …nanced investment abroad, so that the domestic tax base is reduced further. The result that the government sets " = 0, together with ¿ = t, implies that production e¢ciency is preserved, i.e. the cost of capital is the same as in the absence of taxes: Á 1 = r (1 + ª)
The impact of foreign …rm ownership
Assume now that the ownership of the …rm is symmetrically distributed among all countries, so that the representative household in country j only owns a share¯j = 1=n of the …rm's equity. As in the preceding section, we assume that income shifting through internal debt is ruled out. The optimal levels of the tax on labour income and the personal tax on savings are again determined by standard optimal tax considerations as described above. We therefore concentrate on the corporate tax system. Here we may state Proposition 2 If …rm ownership is distributed symmetrically among all countries ¡¯j = 1=n; j = 1::n ¢ and income shifting is ruled out, the optimal tax policy of country j implies ¿ j < t j and " j = 0. Real investment is subsidized: Á j < r(1 + ª).
Interestingly, while the government sets ¿ j = t j if the household entirely owns the …rms operating within the country, we now have ¿ j < t j , which implies that foreign …rm ownership reduces the corporate tax rate and leads to a situation where investment is e¤ectively subsidized. This happens for the following reason. The corporate income tax has the function to prevent that households avoid personal income taxes by increasing equity …nancing and overinvesting in the domestic corporate sector. The government designs the corporate income tax system so that the e¤ect of a marginal change in domestic investment K j on the government budget constraint is zero. Given the …nancial structure ® j , an increase in domestic investment by one Euro reduces dividend distributions to and, hence, private savings of domestic households in period 1 by¯j(1 ¡ ® j ) Euros. As a result, the revenue from the savings tax declines by rt¯j (1 ¡ ® j ). The optimal corporate tax neutralizes this revenue loss. But if the domestic ownership share¯j is small, the optimal corporate income tax declines. In our model, if n approaches in…nity, i.e. the ownership share of the domestic household in the …rms operating domestically becomes negligible, the optimal corporate tax rate approaches zero.
The result that the corporate tax rate declines as foreign ownership of domestic …rms increases is diametrically opposed to the …ndings in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) , where foreign …rm ownership leads to higher corporate tax rates. The reason for this di¤erence is that the corporate tax in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) has a di¤erent economic function. In their model, …rms earn supernormal pro…ts which cannot be taxed directly. Therefore, a corporate tax which distorts investment is used as an indirect way of taxing these pro…ts. If foreign …rm ownership increases, an increasing share of pro…ts generated domestically accrues to foreigners, so that the burden of domestic corporate taxes also partly falls on foreigners. Consequently, more foreign …rm ownership increases the optimal corporate tax rate. In our model, this type of tax exporting motive does not exist.
Income Shifting without foreign …rm ownership
We now consider the case where …rms may use internal debt to avoid domestic corporate income taxes. In order to be able to focus on the role of income shifting, we abstract from foreign …rm ownership by considering the case where the household of country 1 owns 100% of the multinational …rm's equity. As in the preceding section, we focus on the optimal corporate tax policy which is summarized by Proposition 3 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is concentrated in country 1 (¯1 = 1), the optimal tax system implies ¿ 1 < t 1 and " 1 < 0. Production e¢ciency is preserved: Á 1 = r (1 + ª 1 ). Proof: See the appendix.
It turns out that the existence of income shifting induces governments to reduce the corporate tax rate and at the same time to broaden the tax base by curtailing depreciation allowances. This may be explained as follows. The government wants to reduce the corporate tax rate in order to limit the incentives to shift income to tax havens via internal debt. But reducing the corporate tax rate below the income tax rate distorts the choice between equity and external debt in favour of equity. The optimal corporate tax rate re ‡ects the trade-o¤ between the aims of reducing income shifting and the desire to limit the distortion of the …nancial structure of …rms in favour of equity.
14 Next to the e¤ect on the …nancial structure 14 The existence of external debt thus acts as a break on corporate tax rate reductions. A referee raised the question of how the results would change if we assumed that …rms did not use external debt at all. In this case, it can be shown that the government would set ¿ < t and " = ¡1, i.e. the pressure to broaden corporate tax bases and to reduce tax rates would increase. The proof for this result is available from the authors on request.
of the …rm, the reduction of the corporate tax rate below the income tax rate t also implies that the domestic tax system subsidizes domestic real investment. Since such a subsidy is not desirable, the government reduces depreciation allowances (" j < 0) in order to restore production e¢ciency.
How is the result in proposition 3 related to explanations for tax rate cut cum base broadening policies existing in the literature? Hau ‡er and Schjelderup (2000) consider a model where …rms make pure pro…ts and may use transfer pricing to shift these pro…ts to tax haven countries. Without pro…t shifting via transfer prices, national governments would levy cash ‡ow taxes which allow to tax pure pro…ts at 100% without distorting the marginal investment decision. If however …rms can avoid a con…scatory taxation of their pro…ts by shifting pro…ts to other countries, countries will reduce their tax rates below 100% in order to limit the incentives for income shifting. But given that pure pro…ts are now partly untaxed, it is no longer optimal to preserve production e¢ciency. Instead, countries broaden their tax bases and deviate from production e¢ciency. The di¤erence to our results is that, in our model, there are no supernormal pro…ts and, more importantly, the broadening of the tax base aims at restoring production e¢ciency rather than deviating from it.
Bond (2000) explains the tax rate cut cum base broadening policy as re ‡ecting the view that multinational …rms make discrete investment decisions which are guided by average rather than marginal tax rates. Osmundsen, Hagen, and Schjelderup (1998) consider a world where …rms di¤er with respect to their mobility and corporate tax policy is plagued by problems of asymmetric information. In this framework, a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy is optimal because it improves incentives for relatively immobile …rms to reveal their true type instead of mimicking mobile …rms.
Income shifting and foreign …rm ownership
The case analyzed in the preceding section refers to a world where …rm ownership is completely concentrated in one country. Given the setup of our model, this would imply that there are n ¡ 1 countries where the domestic household owns no equity of the multinational …rm, so that these countries do not levy corporate income taxes. Such an equilibrium is not realistic. In this section, we therefore consider the case where income shifting exists but countries are symmetric, i.e. the representative household in each country owns a share¯j = 1=n of the …rm's equity. The optimal tax policy is now as follows:
Proposition 4 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is distributed symmetrically among all countries (¯j = 1=n; j = 1::n), the optimal tax policy of country j implies ¿ j < t j and " j < 0. Real investment is subsidized: Á j < r(1 + ª). Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that, in the presence of both income shifting and foreign …rm ownership, the e¤ects discussed in the preceding sections are combined. Propositions 3 and 4 have in common that the optimal tax policy implies ¿ j < t j and " j < 0. This means that a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy is optimal for any ownership structure (apart from the extreme case of¯j = 0, where country j does not levy corporate taxes). It is su¢cient that income shifting through internal debt occurs. The explanation for this result is that governments reduce their corporate tax rates in order to limit the use of internal debt. But this has the undesirable consequence that domestic investment is subsidized, at the margin. The broadening of the tax base corrects this distortion. The result in proposition 4 that real investment is subsidized (whereas this is not the case in proposition 3) is a consequence of foreign …rm ownership.
Policy coordination
It is natural to ask whether there is room for welfare enhancing policy coordination among the n countries of the union. It is well known from the literature on tax coordination that a case for tax coordination can be made on the basis that the elasticity of capital supply for the union as a whole may di¤er from the elasticity of capital supply faced by individual countries. By assuming that the e¤ect of the union on the world interest rate is negligible, this class of arguments in favour of tax coordination is ruled out in our model. Moreover, it is well known that asymmetries between countries considerably complicates the analysis of tax coordination because some countries may gain at the expense of other countries. We therefore focus on the question of tax coordination among symmetric countries. Here, we may state:
Proposition 5 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is distributed symmetrically among all countries ¡¯j = 1=n; j = 1::n ¢ , a coordinated increase of the corporate tax rate, departing from the equilibrium without coordination and holding constant the depreciation parameter ", increases welfare. Proof: See the appendix.
The reason for the positive welfare e¤ect of an increase in the corporate tax rate is best understood by considering the …scal externalities associated with a change in the tax rate. A higher corporate tax rate in country j reduces the share of equity in the …nancing of real investment in this country, i.e. ® j increases. Moreover, an increase in ¿ j raises the cost of capital in country j and reduces the level of real investment K j . Both e¤ects raise the dividend distributed in period 1. Since …rm ownership is symmetrically distributed over all countries of the union, the higher dividend in period 1 increases private savings and, hence, revenue from the savings tax in all countries. This e¤ect on savings tax revenue in other countries constitutes a positive …scal externality.
One may note that this reason for the positive welfare e¤ect of a coordinated increase in the corporate tax rate di¤ers from the standard argument in favour of corporate tax coordination, which is based on the idea that higher taxes in one country increase real investment in other countries. This type of …scal externality is absent from our model because the union is assumed to have no impact on the interest rate in the world capital market. 15 For similar reasons, our model allows to make a case for tax base coordination:
Proposition 6 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is distributed symmetrically among all countries ¡¯j = 1=n; j = 1::n ¢ , a coordinated reduction of the depreciation parameter " j , departing from the equilibrium without coordination and holding constant the corporate tax rate, increases welfare. Proof: See the appendix.
The reduction in the depreciation parameter implies a further broadening of the tax base (note that the reform already departs from an equilibrium with " j < 0). The reason for the positive welfare e¤ect of a coordinated broadening of the tax base is again that changes in the depreciation parameter in one country give rise to a …scal externality: under tax competition, the individual countries do not take into account that, by broadening the tax base, real investment of the multinational …rm declines and more funds are distributed in period 1, so that savings tax revenue in all countries increases.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the implications of international income shifting and foreign …rm ownership for corporate tax policy. Our analysis has shown that foreign …rm ownership does not necessarily act as a break on tax rate reductions. Moreover, tax rate cut cum base broadening policies may be seen as a reaction of national tax policies to income shifting through internal debt. This result is similar to the …ndings in Hau ‡er and Schjelderup (2000), but the reason for the broadening of the tax base and the implications for production e¢ciency are di¤erent. Finally, we have shown that there is a potential for welfare enhancing coordination of tax rates and tax bases in our model.
There are several limitations of our analysis which should be taken into account. Firstly, our analysis is based on the assumption that residence based taxation of personal savings is possible. It is well known that taxpayers may evade these taxes relatively easily by holding bank accounts in other countries. But as long as interest income can at least partly be taxed on a residence basis, our …ndings should continue to hold. Secondly, we assume that foreign …rm ownership is given and ask how the optimal tax policy reacts to this. This neglects that the structure of …rm ownership itself will be in ‡uenced by taxes. Clearly, investigating this is beyond the scope of this paper. 16 Another, more fundamental issue raised by our analysis is whether countries should simply abolish interest deductions in order to avoid income shifting through debt. In our model, this would give rise to a severe distortion of the …nancial structure of …rms in favour of equity …nancing, so that zero interest deductions are unlikely to be optimal. But it is not clear that this is a su¢cient reason to maintain the full deductibility of interest. We intend to investigate this issue in future research.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we give the proofs of propositions 1-6. We start by deriving the …rst-order conditions (f.o.c.) for the optimal tax policy. These will be used in the proofs of all propositions. The Lagrangean for the government's problem is
16 For an analysis of the impact of economic integration on tax policy in a model with endogenous foreign …rm ownership see Fuest (2003) . 
We focus on the case where the constraint "¸¡1 is not binding, so that # = 0. Given this, equations (A.3) to (A.5) can be transformed into:
Proof of proposition 1. If ¾ j = 0; @¾j @¿ j = 0,¯j = 1; j = 1, and using (A.4) in (A.2), (A.1) and (A.2) yield (15) and (16) in proposition 1. (A.7) and (A.6) collapse to ¿ j = t j and " j = 0. Q.E.D. Proof of proposition 2. If ¾ j = 0; @¾ j @¿ j = 0,¯j = 1=n; j = 1:::n, (A.7) yields
Proof of proposition 5. A coordinated change in ¿ j ; j = 1::::n a¤ects welfare directly and via the induced change in the cost of capital. The change in the cost of capital is given by
Using the results of proposition 4, this can be transformed into
The e¤ect on the welfare of country j is given by
Given that the f.o.c. for the optimal policy under tax competition imply @¡j @¿ j = 0 and @¡j @Á j = 0, the welfare e¤ect is equal to
Proof of proposition 6. A coordinated change in " j ; j = 1::::n a¤ects welfare directly and via the induced change in the cost of capital. The change in the cost of capital is given by
Given that the f.o.c. for the optimal policy under tax competition imply @¡ j @"j = 0 and @¡ j @Á j = 0, the welfare e¤ect is equal to
which implies that a coordinated reduction in " increases welfare. Q.E.D.
